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Abstract
Following the Great Recession, despite large and persistent slowdown in
economic activity, the fall in inflation was modest. This is known as the missing
deflation puzzle. In this paper, we develop and estimate a New Keynesian
model to provide an explanation for the puzzle. The new model allows for time-
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changes in intermediate input prices. We show that inflation did not fall much
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I INTRODUCTION
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have
become an important tool for monetary policy analysis and forecasting at central
banks and other policy institutions around the world. However, the failure of these
models to forecast behaviour of inflation and other key macroeconomic variables
following the 2008 Great Recession has been interpreted as an evidence against this
class of models. Two important papers in this regard are Ball and Mazumder (2011)
and Hall (2011). Ball and Mazumder make their point by forecasting inflation for
the period between 2008 and 2010 using the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC),
which determines inflation in these models. They find that the NKPC estimated
using data from 1960 to 2007 cannot explain inflation over the forecast period. Hall
criticises the NKPC on the basis that it fails to provide an explanation for the ’missing
deflation’ puzzle. Missing deflation is characterised as higher levels of actual inflation
than what the NKPC would predict in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fourth quarter of 2008, the output
gap worsened to more than 6%. While the recession officially ended in the second
quarter of 2009, the output gap remained significantly negative for a considerable
period after that. It took almost ten years until the output gap was completely
closed. As Hall emphasises, given the persistent negative output gap, the NKPC
would predict persistent deflation. However, this did not happen. Although inflation
fell at the start of the crisis, it soon recovered and remained higher than suggested
by the NKPC.
This paper offers an explanation for the missing deflation puzzle. We argue that a
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reason for the puzzle may be increasing intermediate input prices. Real intermediate
input prices experienced a sharp increase between 2009 and 2011 (see Figure 2).
While input prices started to fall after 2011, the fall was small and gradual. It took
more than four years for prices to return to their 2007 level. Higher intermediate
input prices drove up firms’ marginal costs, offsetting the deflationary effect of the
Great Recession. Therefore, inflation did not fall as much as it otherwise would have
during the post-2008 period.
We test our argument by using a modified version of the Smets and Wouters
(2007) (henceforth SW) model. Specifically, we reformulate the SW model to include
the financial frictions mechanism in Bernanke et al. (1999) (henceforth BGG) and
to account for changes in intermediate input prices. Further, we remove the price
mark-up shocks in the model and, following Aoki (2001), De Walque et al. (2006)
and Huang and Liu (2005), consider supply-side shocks that arise from changes in
relative intermediate input prices. Let us briefly explain these additions to the SW
model.
To incorporate intermediate prices in the SW model, we divide production into
two sectors. In one of the two sectors intermediate inputs are produced. The second
sector produces finished goods. Marginal costs in the finished goods sector also
depend on the relative price of intermediate inputs. Prices in both sectors are set
according to Calvo (1983) pricing. Therefore, inflation in both sectors depend on
sector-specific current and future marginal costs. We further assume that prices in
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the intermediate inputs sector are subject to a sector-specific shock.1 As a result, in
addition to marginal costs, inflation in the intermediate inputs sector also depends
on the sector-specific input-price shock.
Turning to the second addition, as is well-known (see, e.g. Christiano et al.
(2014), henceforth CMR), the BGG mechanism models the idiosyncratic uncertainty
faced by entrepreneurs. The common assumption is that the volatility of cross-
sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty fluctuates over time. This measure of volatility is
referred to as risk. In line with CMR, we assume that the risk shock process has both
unanticipated (or stochastic) and anticipated (or news) components. Several recent
papers (e.g. CMR and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)) show that accounting for the
anticipated component improves the empirical performance of the model significantly.
The rest of the model is exactly the same as that in SW.
Next, we estimate the new model for US data using Bayesian techniques for
the period from 1965Q1 until 2013Q2. We then back out input-price shocks to the
intermediate inputs producing sector. Finally, we compare the dynamics of inflation
and marginal costs from our model, with and without input-price shocks, for the
period when the output gap remained significantly negative: from 2009 until 2013.
The results confirm our suggestion that intermediate input prices played a crucial
1Here we do not seek to provide an answer to another important question: What drives interme-
diate input prices? It is possible that most intermediate input prices are determined in international
auction markets. Feenstra and Weinstein (2017) show that globalisation has increased the share of
foreign firms in US domestic absorption. Fally (2012) shows that value addition has shifted from
upstream industries towards downstream industries. A shift in value addition away from inter-
mediate industries and an increase in competition from foreign firms may have decreased market
power in upstream industries. This could explain the increase in the degree of synchronisation
between intermediate input prices and global economic activity. We leave exploring this further
for future research. The sector-specific shock in the intermediate sector is meant to capture such
factors affecting intermediate input prices.
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role in explaining inflation dynamics during the period when the output gap was
significantly negative. When we shutdown shocks to intermediate input prices, the
counterfactual inflation and marginal costs fall persistently following the crisis - but
not, when feeding in the backed out input-price shocks. This is because, in our model,
inflation depends not only on the output gap, as in the standard New Keynesian
model, but also on the relative price of intermediate inputs. Therefore, the increase
in intermediate input prices offsets most of the decrease in marginal costs driven by
the persistent slowdown in economic activity after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Turning to the role of financial frictions, the BGG mechanism plays a crucial role
in explaining output dynamics in the model. It helps capture the drop in output at
the beginning of the crisis. We find that both components of the risk shock process,
anticipated and unanticipated, are important for capturing the fall in output. The
intuitive explanation for the importance of the anticipated component is as follows.
Anticipating that future uncertainty will increase, banks increase the interest rate
they charge on loans. An increase in the interest rate further depresses investment,
thus leading to a larger fall in output and, consequently, inflation.2 However, the fall
in inflation is offset by the increase in intermediate input prices.
This paper is closely related to earlier papers by Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2015) and Del Negro et al. (2015) (henceforth NGS). Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2015) show that ‘missing deflation’ is a one-off event in response to rising oil prices.
However, in our model, accounting for oil prices alone does not have a significant
2In the previous version of this paper, we also find the anticipated component of the risk shock
to play an important role in correctly forecasting observed contraction in output growth at the start
of the crisis.
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effect on inflation. This is because, at around 1%, the share of oil in production is very
small. Further, our paper differs from Coibion and Gorodnichenko in its modelling
approach. While their analysis is based on the expectations−augmented Phillips
curve proposed by Friedman (1968), ours is carried out in a New Keynesian general
equilibrium framework in which the Phillips curve is micro-founded. Nevertheless,
by focusing on intermediate input prices instead of oil prices, this paper further
strengthens their conclusion by showing that their finding of missing deflation being
a one-off event has a wider applicability and holds also in a New Keynesian general
equilibrium model.
NGS, on the other hand, employ a New Keynesian model with BGG-type financial
frictions and argue that the near stability of inflation following the Great Recession
was due to anchored expectations. Their results depend on having a large degree
of price stickiness and, therefore, a very flat NKPC. At 8 quarters, average age of
price contracts in NGS is twice that in micro evidence on prices (Klenow and Malin
(2011)). NGS suggest that since inflation expectations remained anchored, prices
were not revised downwards substantially despite sharp contraction in output.
Another possible explanation for the stability of inflation in aftermath of the
Great Recession is forwarded by Gilchrist et al. (2016). Gilchrist et al. note that
financially constrained firms raise their prices following adverse financial shocks.
They do this because financially constrained firms find it difficult to access external
finance, since they face a higher risk of default. As a result, they raise their prices to
maintain internal liquidity even at the cost of a decrease in firm’s market share. On
the other hand, firms that are not financially constrained cut their prices in response
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to a decrease in demand for their products. The explanation in Gilchrist et al. and
the one provided in this paper have important implications for firms’ price mark-ups:
In Gilchrist et al., mark-ups increase because financially constrained firms raise their
prices in order to maintain internal liquidity. Whereas the explanation in this paper
implies increasing mark-ups for intermediate inputs producing firms and decreasing
mark-ups for finished goods producing firms.
The implication for finished goods firms’ mark-ups in this paper is in line with the
explanation for missing deflation suggested in Christiano et al. (2015). Christiano
et al. propose that inflation did not fall due to increases in firms’ marginal costs.
However, the reason for increasing marginal costs is different in Christiano et al. than
in this paper. Following the Great Recession, borrowing costs increased substantially.
Therefore, financially constrained firms that were previously financing their operating
costs (e.g. wage bills) through borrowing experienced an increase in their financing
costs. This increased firms’ marginal costs and, therefore, kept inflation stable.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the model.
Section III and IV explain the estimation strategy and present estimation results,
respectively. Section V analyses dynamics of inflation with and without input-price
shocks. Section VI explores how expectations about long-run inflation interact with
input-price shocks in our model. We also test if our results are sensitive to alterna-
tive values of intermediate share in finished goods production. Finally, Section VII
concludes.
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II THE MODEL
The model in this paper builds on the model by SW to allow for input-output
linkages between intermediate inputs and finished goods producing firms. It also ac-
counts for the idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs. While production of
intermediate inputs requires labour and capital as only factors of production, produc-
tion of finished goods also requires intermediate inputs as an additional factor input.
The two sectors also face the financial accelerator mechanism of BGG where financial
market frictions arising through information asymmetry and agency costs affect the
real side of the economy. In this we follow the work of NGS and CMR. Finally, the
modelling of households and the monetary policy is standard New Keynesian.
In the rest of this section, we describe the behaviour of firms in the two sectors
followed by description of the BGG financial frictions. The behaviour of households
and monetary authority is similar to SW and is, therefore, not included here for
brevity. The model is detrended using a deterministic labour-augmenting trend. For
estimations, the model is linearised around the stationary steady-state of detrended
variables. All nominal variables are expressed in capital letters. Variables which
are written in small letters in log-linearised equations are real expressions of their
nominal counterparts and are in terms of deviation from their corresponding steady-
state value.
II.I Intermediate and Finished Goods
There is a continuum of firms in each sector: a finished goods sector (s); and, an
intermediate inputs sector (m). Firms in both sectors produce under an imperfectly
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competitive market and have monopoly power over a differentiated good. Each firm
within two sectors produces a single differentiated good, Y sf,t and Y
m
j,t , respectively.
These sector-specific differentiated goods are then combined to produce a sector-
specific final good according to:
Y st =
[∫ 1
0
(Y sf,t)
ρ−1
ρ df
] ρ
ρ−1
(1)
Y mt =
[∫ 1
0
(Y mj,t )
ρ−1
ρ dj
] ρ
ρ−1
(2)
where ρ is elasticity of substitution between sector-specific differentiated goods.
Firms in the finished goods sector use labour, capital and intermediate inputs as
factors of production. The production function of firms is given by:
Y sf,t =
[
Y mf,t
]µ{
AtK
s
f,t
α
[
γtLsf,t
]1−α }1−µ − γtΦ (3)
where Y mf,t is intermediate sector goods used as an additional input by firm f in the
finished goods sector. Lsf,t is a composite of labour input and K
s
f,t is capital services.
µ and Φ is input-output elasticity and fixed costs, respectively. γt represents the
labour-augmenting deterministic growth rate in the economy. At is the productivity
shock which follows an AR(1) process of the form:
at = ρaat−1 + εa,t (4)
where at = lnAt and ρa determines persistence of the productivity shock process.
εa,t is the i.i.d. shock with mean zero and standard deviation σa.
Firms minimise their costs in equation (5) subject to their production function:
minWtL
s
f,t +Rk,tK
s
f,t + Pm,tY
m
f,t (5)
where Wt, Rk,t and Pm,t is the nominal wage rate, rental rate of capital and inter-
mediate input price, respectively. Cost minimisation problem gives the following
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log-linearised expression for marginal costs:
mcst = (1− µ)(αrkt + (1− α)wt) + µpmt − at (6)
where mcst denotes real marginal costs in the finished goods sector. The demand
function for intermediate inputs is given by:
ymf,t = mc
s
t − pmt + ysf,t (7)
Firms in the finished goods sector take input prices as given. Finished goods
prices are set according to Calvo (1983) with no ad-hoc price indexation. The log-
linearised NKPC in this sector is given by:
πst = βγ
1−σcπst+1 + κ
smcst (8)
where πst is inflation in the finished goods sector. κ
s is given by
κs =
(1− ζpβγ1−σc)(1− ζp)
ζp
(9)
where ζp is the Calvo parameter for price stickiness and β is the discount factor. σc
represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Unlike in the finished goods sector, firms in the intermediate inputs sector only
use labour and capital as two factors of production to produce a differentiated good.
The production function in this sector is given by:
Y mj,t = At
[
Kmj,t
]α[
γtLmj,t
]1−α − EtγtΦ (10)
where Lmj,t is a composite of labour input and K
m
j,t is capital services used in the
intermediate sector by firm j. α and Φ are capital-output elasticity and fixed costs,
respectively.
The production function in equation (10) also includes a shock to fixed costs
(Et). This shock is meant to capture changes in production that arise from external
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factors, such as unusually cold winters and rare disasters.3 Et follows an ARMA(1,1)
process of the form:
et = ρeet−1 + εe,t − µeεe,t−1 (11)
where et = lnEt and ρe determines persistence of the shock process. εe,t is the
i.i.d. shock with mean zero and standard deviation σe. We assume that the shock
affects the intermediate inputs sector only. However, it has an indirect effect on
the finished goods sector. An unusually cold winter would cause a disruption in the
production of intermediate inputs. A decrease in the supply of intermediate inputs
will consequently affect finished goods production as well.4
Firm j in the intermediate inputs sector solves the following cost minimisation
problem:
minWtL
m
j,t +Rk,tK
m
j,t (12)
The log-linearised expression for real marginal costs is given by:
mcmt = αr
k
t + (1− α)wt − at (13)
As in the finished goods sector, firms in the intermediate inputs sector also set
their prices according to Calvo (1983) with no ad-hoc price indexation. The NKPC
in the intermediate inputs sector is given by:
πmt = βγ
1−σcπmt+1 + κ
m(mcmt − pmt ) + ϕt (14)
3Another reason for including the Et shock is a technical one. Since we include an additional
data series on intermediate prices in our estimations, we need an additional shock to ensure that
the number of observed variables are equal to the number of shocks. In any case, Et does not play a
significant role in driving model results. A variance decomposition analysis suggests that this shock
explains only about 3.35% and 1.81% of fluctuations in output growth and inflation, respectively.
In an alternative setting, following Barro (2006) and Gourio (2012), we model the Et shock as a
shock to capital. Our main conclusions are robust to this alternate specification.
4In an alternative setting, we assume that the shock affects both the intermediate inputs and
the finished goods sectors directly. Doing so does not change our main results significantly.
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where πmt is inflation in the intermediate inputs sector. κ
m is the slope coefficient of
the form:
κm =
(1− ζmp βγ1−σc)(1− ζmp )
ζmp
(15)
where ζmp is the Calvo parameter for price stickiness specific to the intermediate
sector. ϕt in equation (14) is an input-price shock which is intended to capture
international factors driving intermediate input prices. ϕt follows an ARMA(1,1)
process of the form5:
ϕt = ρϕϕt−1 + εϕ,t − µϕεϕ,t−1 (16)
The following subsection describes the financial accelerator mechanism which is
identical to that in NGS.
II.II The Financial Accelerator Mechanism and the Risk
Shock
The introduction of financial frictions in the model alters the arbitrage equation.
The arbitrage equation between the return on capital and the riskless rate in SW is
replaced with an equation for capital returns and an equation for the spread between
capital returns and the riskless rate. The equation determining the spread is:
Et[R̃
k
t+1 −Rt] = bt + ζsp,b(qkt + k̄t − nt) + σ̃w,t (17)
Equation (17) has the SW arbitrage equation as a special case when the param-
eter (ζsp,b) associated with the ratio of the value of installed capital to net worth
(
Qkt+i−1K̄t+i−1
Nt+i−1
) is zero. qkt is the real value of the capital stock, k̄t is capital stock and
nt is net worth of entrepreneurs. σ̃w,t is the risk shock and R̃
k
t denotes capital return
5Our results are robust to alternate specifications for the shock process.
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to the entrepreneurs. R̃kt can also be interpreted as required returns on capital, since
entrepreneurs’ borrowing costs within the model always equal R̃kt , and is given by:
R̃kt − πt =
rk∗
rk∗ + (1− δ)
rkt +
1− δ
rk∗ + (1− δ)
qkt − qkt−1 (18)
where rk∗ is the steady-state rental rate of capital and δ is the rate of depreciation of
capital stock. Entrepreneurs’ net worth (nt) evolves according to:
nt = ζn,R̃k(R̃
k
t − πt)− ζn,R(Rt−1 − πt) + ζn,qk(qkt−1 + k̄t−1) + ζn,nnt−1 (19)
Following CMR and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), we assume the following
process for the risk shock:
σ̃w,t = ρσ̃σ̃w,t−1 + uσ̃,t (20)
where
uσ̃,t = ρσ̃,nuσ̃,t−1 + εσ̃,t (21)
After straightforward algebra, the last two equations can be rewritten as:
σ̃ω,t+i = ρσ̃σ̃ω,t+i−1 + ρ
i
σ̃,nεσ̃,t + ρ
i
σ̃,n
∞∑
j=1
ρjσ̃,nεσ̃,t−j (22)
where 0 < ρσ̃, ρσ̃,n < 1 and εσ̃,t is i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) and
denotes the unanticipated component of risk (σ̃ω,t). Eq. (22) is an attempt to mimic
the effect of the Lehman shock which increased both current and future risk in the
economy. To see this more clearly, consider a financial shock (εσ̃,t) in period ‘t ’. εσ̃,t
affects the economy in period ‘t ’ via two channels. First, εσ̃,t increases risk in period
‘t ’ (σ̃ω,t). Second, it also increases future risk (σ̃ω,t+i) and thus affects the current
state of the economy through agents’ intertemporal adjustment. εσ̃,t will receive less
weight the further agents look into the future. ρiω,n is the weight on εσ̃,t for risk in
period ‘t+ i′.
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We call εσ̃,t−j an anticipated component whose value was revealed in t− j. Thus,
at time t the realisation of the risk σ̃ω,t is influenced by the combined impact of both
the unanticipated and the anticipated components. Furthermore, as Christiano et
al. (2010) argue, such a generalised shock process helps to “tackle the deep-seated
misspecification problems in DSGE models.”
The rest of model equations are the same as in SW and are listed in the Online
Appendix.
III ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We estimate our model for the US economy for the period from 1965Q1 to 2013Q2
using Bayesian estimation techniques.6 In the estimation, we use ten macroeconomic
series at the quarterly frequency. Six of these series are the same as those employed
by SW. These series are the log difference of real GDP, real consumption, real in-
vestment, real wage, log hours worked and log difference of the GDP deflator.
We use the shadow federal funds rate, as estimated in Wu and Xia (2016), in
estimations, instead of the federal funds rate.7 The reason why we use the shadow
rate is that our estimation period includes a period of zero lower bound and un-
conventional monetary policies. As a result, the federal funds rate may not capture
the actual stance of monetary policy during this period. Unlike the federal funds
rate, the shadow rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound. Wu and Xia show
6We ensure an acceptance rate of around 30% and allow for 250,000 replications for the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Estimation is done in Dynare 4.5.3.
7A detailed discussion on how the shadow rate is estimated is available in Wu and Xia (2016).
The series for the shadow rate is available on the Atlanta Fed’s website.
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that the shadow funds rate better captures the stance of monetary policy during this
period.
The additional series we employ are data on credit spreads, 10-year inflation
expectations and the log difference of real intermediate input prices. The credit
spread is the difference between the interest rate on BAA-rated corporate bonds
and the 10 year US government bond rate. We obtain data for 10-year inflation
expectations from Blue Chip Economic Indicators and Professional Forecasters sur-
veys. Using data on inflation expectations is helpful since, as pointed out by Del
Negro and Eusepi (2011) and Kiley (2008), inflation expectations contain information
about people’s beliefs regarding the FED’s inflation objectives. Survey data indicate
that long-run inflation expectations remained anchored to the FED’s inflation target
throughout the relevant period. Using inflation expectations data can capture this
fact. We discuss the importance of inflation expectations for our results in more
detail in section VI.
The intermediate input price data we use to identify input-price shocks are from
the St. Louis FED database. The specific series we employ is Producer Price Index
by Commodity for Intermediate Demand by Commodity Type: Processed Goods for
Intermediate Demand (WPSID61).8
8This series is part of the BLS forward-flow model of production and price change (i.e. FD-
ID system). This model organises commodities (i.e. goods and services) into stages and tracks
input price changes at each stage, using BEA’s commodity-consumption and industry-production
data. Commodities included in the preceding stage are primarily used as inputs in production
of commodities in the current stage (See page 11 and chapter 14 of BLS Handbook of Methods
for further details, which is available here: https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/02/art1full.pdf).
This approach is useful since it allows for studying how price shocks are transmitted forward from
preceding to subsequent stages of production. The intermediate price index chosen in this paper
is the index representing input prices for finished goods producing firms (i.e. the final production
stage).
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Measurement equations relating data to model variables are:
OutputGrowth =γ + 100(yt − yt−1)
ConsumptionGrowth =γ + 100(ct − ct−1)
InvestmentGrowth =γ + 100(it − it−1)
RealWageGrowth =γ + 100(wt − wt−1)
HoursWorked =l̄ + 100lt
Inflation =π∗ + 100πt
ShadowFederalFundsRate =R∗ + 100Rt
Spread =SP∗ + Et[R̃
k
t+1 −Rt]
10yrInflExp =π∗ + Et[
1
40
Σ40k=1πt+k]
IntermediateInflation =πϕ + 100(p
m
t − pmt−1)
(23)
where l̄, π∗ = 100(Π∗ − 1) and R∗ = 100(β−1γσcΠ∗ − 1) are the steady-state of the
quarterly hours worked, inflation and nominal interest rates, respectively. πϕ and SP∗
are the steady-state of intermediate price inflation and credit spread, respectively.
All variables are expressed in percent.
Table 3 and Table 4 summarise our assumptions regarding prior distributions.
Priors for most of model parameters are similar to those in SW. Calvo parameters
for intermediate and finished goods sectors are specified a Beta prior distribution with
standard deviation of 0.10. Surveying the literature starting from 1920s, Goldberg
and Hellerstein (2011) note that “the conventional wisdom in the literature has come
to be that producer prices are more rigid than ... consumer prices”. However, using
micro-data on prices complied by the US BLS for the period from 1987 to 2008,
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Table 1: Exogenous parameter values
Parameter Definition Values
β Discount factor 0.9995
γ Trend growth rate 1.004
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
εw Curvature of the Kimball labour market aggregator 10
gy Government spending-output ratio 0.18
µ Share of intermediate inputs in finished goods firms’ pro-
duction
0.60
µu Share of sector-specific labour and capital in aggregate
labour and capital
0.50
these authors then go on to find that producer prices for finished goods have more or
less the same price rigidity as consumers prices. Focussing on the period from 1998
to 2005, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) also reach similar conclusion. Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) further report that intermediate input prices are more flexible
than both finished goods producer prices and consumer prices. Despite the fact that
Nakamura and Steinsson focus on a more recent period (our dataset starts from 1965),
we assume that the prior mean for the Calvo parameter is lower for input prices than
for finished goods prices. Specifically, the prior mean for the Calvo parameter in the
intermediate inputs sector is assumed to be 0.40, while the corresponding parameter
in the finished goods sector is set at 0.75.
Following Huang and Liu (2005), the share of intermediate inputs in finished
goods production (µ) is calibrated to 60%. We assume that aggregation is done
using a Dixit and Stiglitz aggregator and therefore εp equals 1. Table 1 reports
values for parameters that are fixed in estimation.
We now turn to parameter values for the financial sector. Following CMR, we
17
Table 2: Financial Frictions: Exogenous parameter values
Entrepreneurs:
F ∗(ω̄) Percent of businesses that go into bankruptcy in a year 0.01
V ar(logω) Variance of the log-normally distributed i.i.d shock 0.24
τ Fraction of entrepreneurs surviving to the next period 0.9728
µe Monitoring costs 0.31
rk∗ Rental rate of capital 0.045
calibrate the survival rate of entrepreneurs (τ) as 97.28% and the percentage of
businesses going bankrupt (F ∗(ω̄)) as 1% annually. To match the risk premium in
the steady-state, the rental rate of capital is assumed to be 0.045. V ar(logω) is set
at 0.24. Different from CMR, µe is endogenous in our model and has a steady-state
value of 0.31, which is less than the value of 0.94 assumed in CMR. Parameters in
the net worth equation are also endogenous. All these numbers are summarised in
Table 2.
We estimate two financial sector parameters in Equations (17) and (23), ζsp,b and
SP∗, respectively. Priors for financial sector parameters are set in line with NGS and
are given in Table 4. SP∗ follows a Gamma distribution with prior mean of 2 and
standard deviation of 0.10. ζsp,b is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with mean
of 0.05 and standard deviation of 0.005. Three parameters related to the risk shock
are the persistence of the shock process (ρσ̄), the standard deviation of the shock
(σσ̄) and the parameter on the anticipated components of the risk shock (ρσ̄,n). ρσ̄
has a Beta prior distribution with mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.15. σσ̄ follows
an Inverse Gamma distribution with mean 0.05 and standard deviation 4. ρσ̄,n also
follows an Inverse Gamma prior distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 2.
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The risk shock follows a process that allows for anticipated signals as explained in
equation (20). The price mark-up shock in SW is replaced with the two supply side
shocks, ϕt and et. We interpret ϕt in equation (14) as shocks arising from changes
in real intermediate input prices. Persistence parameters of the two shock processes
follow a beta prior distribution with mean 0.50 and standard deviation 0.20. The
standard deviation of the intermediate input shock (σϕ) has an Inverse Gamma prior
distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 2. σe also follows an Inverse Gamma
distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 2. Prior distributions of remaining
parameters in the model are identical to those in SW.
IV ESTIMATION RESULTS
Estimated values for structural parameters are reported in Table 3. Table 3 also
includes prior and posterior standard deviations for corresponding parameters.
The posterior mean of the price stickiness parameter (ξp) in the finished goods
sector is 0.74, suggesting an average age of price contract of about 4 quarters. In
contrast, when estimated over the sample period including Great Recession, NGS
and SW models suggest an average age of price contract of around 8 quarters. The
estimated value of ξmp is 0.92, suggesting that intermediate input prices are stickier
than finished goods prices. This finding is consistent with the “conventional wis-
dom” emphasised by Goldberg and Hellerstein (2011). When we estimate the model
using a shorter sample starting from 1981, results are consistent with the findings in
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) that intermediate input prices are more flexible than
finished goods prices. Regardless of which sample we use, our conclusions remain
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Table 3: Prior and Posterior Estimates of Structural Parameters
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
type Mean st. dev. Mean st. dev
structural parameters:
ϕ Normal 4.000 1.500 5.766 0.566
σc Normal 1.500 0.375 1.272 0.045
h Beta 0.700 0.100 0.553 0.034
ξw Beta 0.500 0.100 0.927 0.003
ιw Beta 0.500 0.150 0.429 0.059
σl Normal 2.000 0.750 2.084 0.216
ξsp Beta 0.750 0.100 0.739 0.009
ξmp Beta 0.400 0.100 0.921 0.025
ψ Beta 0.500 0.150 0.475 0.043
φp Normal 1.250 0.125 1.386 0.045
rπ Normal 1.500 0.250 1.471 0.038
ρr Beta 0.500 0.100 0.729 0.018
ry Normal 0.750 0.050 0.629 0.009
π∗s Gamma 0.625 0.100 0.628 0.034
π∗m Normal 0.000 1.000 -0.325 0.039
β̄ Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.079 0.025
l̄ Normal 0.000 2.000 1.504 0.472
γ Normal 0.400 0.100 0.381 0.013
α Normal 0.300 0.050 0.178 0.009
SP∗ Beta 2.000 0.100 1.838 0.028
ζsp,b Beta 0.050 0.005 0.041 0.001
unchanged.
Posterior estimate for ξw further suggests that wages are more sticky than fin-
ished goods prices. The estimate of α is 0.18 and is similar to that reported in SW.
Posterior estimates of parameters governing monetary policy are consistent with em-
pirical evidence: rφ and ry have a posterior mean of 1.47 and 0.63, respectively. The
persistence parameter of the input-price shock (ρϕ) is estimated at 0.30. Reflecting
the highly volatile nature of intermediate input prices, the standard deviation of
input-price shocks is large at 1.39.
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Table 4: Prior and Posterior Estimates of Shock Processes
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
type Mean st. dev. Mean st. dev
persistence of exogenous shocks:
ρa Beta 0.500 0.200 0.940 0.006
ρϕ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.300 0.040
ρei Beta 0.500 0.200 0.973 0.007
ρσ̄ Beta 0.750 0.150 0.457 0.062
ρσ̄,n Beta 0.750 0.150 0.995 0.003
ρb Beta 0.500 0.200 0.988 0.002
ρg Beta 0.500 0.200 0.989 0.004
ρµ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.996 0.001
ρr Beta 0.500 0.200 0.109 0.036
ρw Beta 0.500 0.200 0.510 0.043
ρπ∗ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.891 0.012
µϕ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.148 0.066
µei Beta 0.500 0.200 0.275 0.057
µw Beta 0.500 0.200 0.515 0.039
ρga beta 0.500 0.200 0.027 0.012
σa Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 1.409 0.106
σϕ Inv.Gamma 1.000 2.000 1.389 0.207
σei Inv.Gamma 1.000 2.000 4.347 0.363
σσ̄ Inv.Gamma 0.050 4.000 0.073 0.005
σb Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 0.012 0.001
σg Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 0.514 0.028
σµ Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 0.298 0.029
σr Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 0.269 0.017
σw Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 0.346 0.023
σπ∗ Inv.Gamma 0.100 2.000 0.129 0.017
V Results
Our model is built on the idea that to capture post-2008 inflation dynamics, it is
essential to account for shocks to intermediate input prices. In this section, we test
the validity of this idea using our estimated model. Specifically, we study the role of
such shocks for inflation after the Great Recession. We also discuss the dynamics of
output, because the relationship between inflation and output is a defining feature
of the NKPC. We start by discussing output dynamics.
As noted by NSG and as is shown in Figure 1, incorporating BGG-type financial
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Figure 1: Output Growth Simulations
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Note: The solid black line is observed output growth. Dotted-dashed blue line is the simu-
lation with no BGG mechanism.
frictions is crucial for the model to capture output dynamics during the post-2008
period. Figure 1 plots output growth when the model is simulated without the BGG
mechanism. We obtain this simulated series by setting financial frictions shocks to
zero. Figure 1 also plots the corresponding series from the benchmark model with
the BGG mechanism. The BGG mechanism plays an important role in explaining
output dynamics of the Great Recession between 2008 and 2009. The fall in output
growth is one percentage point less in absence of adverse financial shocks than the
observed fall. While such shocks affect inflation through their effect on output, a
shock decomposition analysis (see Figure 3) suggests that the direct contribution of
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Figure 2: Input-Price Shocks
Input-Price Shocks
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Note: This figure plots input-price shocks from baseline estimations (orange) and also from
a counterfactual exercise where inflation expectations are not anchored (blue). The dash-
black line plots real intermediate input prices. The figure is plotted for the period from
2007Q1 until 2013Q2.
such shocks for inflation is small.
We now turn to studying the role of intermediate input prices in explaining
inflation during the post-2008 period (from 2009Q1 to 2013Q2). To achieve this,
we do counterfactual exercises where we simulate how inflation would have evolved
over the corresponding period had the economy not been hit by intermediate input-
price shocks. For these experiments, we make use of intermediate input-price shocks
we identified in the previous section. We run a counterfactual experiment by setting
these shocks to zero and then compare the resulting inflation series to the actual one.
Before presenting our main analysis, it is helpful to study intermediate input-
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Figure 3: The Contribution of Input-Price Shocks to Inflation
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
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Note: This figure plots the contribution of financial (red) and input-price (blue) shocks
towards explaining fluctuation in actual inflation. The solid black line plots actual inflation.
price shocks we identified. While Figure 2 displays these shocks, Figure 3 plots the
contribution of such shocks towards explaining fluctuations in observed inflation.
As Figure 2 shows, apart from a brief period just before 2009, input-price shocks
are positive before, during and after the Great Recession. Figure 3 indicates that
these shocks had a significant inflationary effect on finished goods prices, offsetting
the deflationary effect of the Great Recession. Figure 3 further shows that negative
input-price shocks at the beginning of the crisis did not have a significant deflationary
effect. This seems to be a result of the fact that these shocks were temporary.
We now turn to answer our main question: Had there been no change in inter-
mediate input prices, what would have happened to inflation? Figure 4 provides
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Figure 4: Inflation Simulation without Input-Price Shocks
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Note: The solid black line is observed inflation. Dashed red line with diamonds is the
simulation when there are no input-price shocks.
an answer to this question by simulating our model after setting input-price shocks
to zero from the first quarter of 2009 until the end of the simulation period (i.e.
ϕ2009Q1:2013Q2=0). When we compare the resulting simulated inflation series to ac-
tual inflation, we see that in absence of input-price shocks, there would have been
persistent deflation. Inflation would have fallen more than it did and would have
remained significantly negative for the whole period. Therefore, these findings sug-
gest that the ‘missing deflation’ puzzle is a consequence of positive intermediate
input-price shocks during the post-2008 period. There would have been no ‘missing
deflation’ puzzle in absence of such shocks.
What is the intuition behind this result? Input-price shocks affect inflation
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Figure 5: Marginal Cost with and without Input-Price Shocks
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Note: The solid black line is smoothed marginal costs, E[mct|Y1:Tfull ]. The dashed red line
is smoothed marginal costs without input-price shocks.
through their effect on finished goods firms’ marginal costs. In the model, inflation
is determined by current and future marginal costs, which depends on intermediate
input prices (see Equation 5). Marginal costs are much higher when input-price
shocks are included. Figure 5 confirms this suggestion, plotting smoothed marginal
costs (MC) both with and without input-price shocks. It appears that increasing
intermediate prices almost completely offset the fall in marginal costs following the
sharp contraction in economic activity. As a consequence, inflation did not fall much
after the Great Recession.
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VI Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of our findings to alternative assump-
tions. We start by testing how sensitive results are to the share of intermediate
inputs in finished goods production (µ). To this end, we re-estimate the model using
alternative calibrations for the share of intermediate inputs and redo the simulations
in section V. We consider three different calibrations: µ = 40%, µ = 50% and
µ = 70%. Figure 6 plots simulation results for these alternative calibrations as well
as those from our benchmark case. The figure shows that our main conclusions that
intermediate price shocks can help account for the missing deflation puzzle holds
even when the intermediate input share is as low as 40%.
When estimating the model, we included long-run inflation expectations data as
an observable to ensure that the model is consistent with the observation that in-
flation expectations remained anchored throughout the simulation period. We now
quantify the role of inflation expectations to see if this assumption is essential for
our results. To achieve this, first, we obtain model-implied inflation expectations
by re-estimating our model after removing long-run inflation expectations data from
estimation. We then construct a new dataset by replacing actual inflation expecta-
tions with model-implied inflation expectations. Next, using our model which was
calibrated according to our benchmark parameter estimates and the new dataset,
we extract shocks using Kalman Smoother. Finally, we use resulting shocks to do
simulations.
Before presenting simulations results from this experiment, it is useful to compare
model-implied inflation expectations with actual data. Figure 7 plots the two series
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Figure 6: Inflation Simulation without Input-Price Shocks
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Note: The solid black line is observed inflation. The dashed red line with diamonds shows
the benchmark case when the intermediate input share is 60%. The other lines show sim-
ulation results for alternative calibrations of the intermediate input share.
and shows that there are differences between them. During the simulation period,
model-implied inflation expectations are lower than actual expectations. Model-
implied expectations are also more volatile than actual series. Input shocks from
both versions of the model are plotted in Figure 2. In the version of the model with
model-implied inflation expectations, input shocks are slightly larger than those in
the benchmark model with actual inflation expectations.
Figure 8 plots simulation results for inflation in the absence of input-price shocks
(blue dash-dotted line). The figure also includes the corresponding inflation series
from our benchmark model (red dash-diamond line). Results suggest that inflation
would have fallen even more in absence of input-price shocks if inflation expectations
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Figure 7: Model Implied Inflation Expectations
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Note: The solid black line is actual inflation expectations data used for baseline estimations
in this paper. The dashed red line is (smoothed) inflation expectations obtained when the
model is estimated without inflation expectations data.
had not remained anchored. However, this difference appears to be small.
These findings show that while including inflation expectations as an observable
helps to explain the puzzle, its contribution is small and accounting for the behaviour
of intermediate input prices during the Great Recession is crucial in explaining the
puzzle.
Finally, we estimate the model by extending our sample to 2018 and study the
relationship between intermediate input prices and inflation beyond our simulation
period which ends in the second quarter of 2013. Our main conclusion that interme-
diate input prices are an important determinant of inflation still holds.
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Figure 8: Inflation Simulation without Input-Price Shocks
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plus No Anchored Expectations
Note: The solid black line is observed inflation. The red dashed-diamond line is the same
as in figure 4. The blue dash-circle line is the simulation result for inflation when there
are no input-price shocks and inflation expectations are unanchored.
VII CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have reformulated the standard New Keynesian model to include
the financial accelerator mechanism and to account for changes in intermediate input
prices. In the new model, intermediate inputs are used as an additional factor input
in the production of finished goods. We have estimated the model using quarterly
US data. The estimated model is then used to do simulation exercises after the
Great Recession to see if the reformulated model can account for the evolution of
key macroeconomic variables over the simulation period.
We have shown that accounting for changes in intermediate input prices provides
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an explanation for the ‘missing deflation’ puzzle. Importantly, our model achieves
this with an empirically relevant degree of price stickiness. In our model, despite per-
sistent worsening of the output gap, inflation does not fall much during the post-2008
period because intermediate input prices were increasing during this time. Increases
in intermediate input prices drove up firms’ marginal costs thus offsetting the defla-
tionary effects of the Great Recession on inflation.
In this paper, we use a specific series to measure intermediate input prices. In
practice, however, many variables can go into intermediate input costs. We choose
this particular series, as it captures the main movements in intermediate input prices,
which is sufficient for our purpose. However, ideally, a model aiming to capture
intermediate input prices may need to make use of the information in the entire
input-output matrix. In addition to this, sectors in the input-output matrix may be
heterogeneous. Sectors that require more intermediate inputs may exhibit different
inflationary responses. A model that accounts for such heterogeneity may generate
new insights. We leave these issues as a matter for future research.
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